Perhaps the BEST B1G Forum anywhere, here at College Football Fan Site, CFB51!!!

I agree with your whole post and I think it is well stated but I wanted to focus on this.  I agree 100%.  Barring some oddity like the less well supplied side destroying the other side VERY quickly or the more well supplied side not having the will power to fight on to victory the more well supplied/equipped side will eventually win.  Everything else (valor, strategy, tactics, etc) will generally just determine how long that victory takes. 

However, I do think there's a confounding factor here: supply lines.

Not that this discounts the idea of which side is better supplied, but that the supply lines need to be factored in as something that the side with longer supply lines must be that much more well resourced in order to be considered "equal". 

In no way was the British empire in the 1770's less well-resourced than the American colonies. But our resources were local to the field of battle whereas the Brits were not. 

That said, I think fundamentally the American victory in the Revolutionary War eventually came down to fatigue on the other side of the pond. I'm sure, had the British truly devoted themselves to the war, that they could have won (even with the French help to the Americans). But the long supply lines made that war much more costly for them than it would have been otherwise, and thus contributed to the fatigue. 

That said, I think fundamentally the American victory in the Revolutionary War eventually came down to fatigue on the other side of the pond. I'm sure, had the British truly devoted themselves to the war, that they could have won (even with the French help to the Americans). But the long supply lines made that war much more costly for them than it would have been otherwise, and thus contributed to the fatigue.

Agreed--and that's part of my point: things are not equal; the desire to fight (the motivation for the war) may be the most significant factor.

To peel a band-aid off a fresh sore, look at what's happening in Afghanistan now. The U.S. and our allies are way better supplied, better equipped, better trained, but...we have struggled to overcome the social structure in that country and how it facilitates the desire and capability of the Taliban to keep its power. So what to do? There is little chance that the U.S. can outlast the Taliban, and winning on the battlefield won't fix it. But, we're still not at the point of walking away from the Taliban's role in Al Qaeda's terrorism. And this kind of thing doesn't lend itself to pithy catchphrases.

“[At Guadalcanal, t]he U.S. Navy lost twenty-four major warships; the Japanese lost twenty-four.  Aircraft losses too were nearly equal: America lost 436, Japan 440.  Ashore, U.S. Marine and Army killed were 1,592 . . . .  The number of Americans killed at sea topped five thousand.  Japanese deaths set a bloody pace for the rest of the war, with 20,800 soldiers lost on the island and probably 4,000 sailors at sea.

“It was the most critical major military operation America would ever run on such a threadbare shoestring. . . .  [T]he puzzle of victory was solved on the fly and on the cheap, in terms of resources if not lives.  The campaign featured tight interdependence among warriors of the air, land, and sea.  For the infantry to seize and hold the island, ships had to control the sea.  For a fleet to control the sea, the pilots had to fly from the island’s airfield.  For the pilots to fly from the airfield, the infantry had to hold the island.  That tripod stood only by the strength of all three legs. . . .  For most of the campaign, Guadalcanal was a contest of equals, perhaps the only major battle in the Pacific where the United States and Japan fought from positions of parity.  Its outcome was often in doubt.”

~ James D. Hornfischer
Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal

To peel a band-aid off a fresh sore, look at what's happening in Afghanistan now. The U.S. and our allies are way better supplied, better equipped, better trained, but...we have struggled to overcome the social structure in that country and how it facilitates the desire and capability of the Taliban to keep its power. So what to do? There is little chance that the U.S. can outlast the Taliban, and winning on the battlefield won't fix it. But, we're still not at the point of walking away from the Taliban's role in Al Qaeda's terrorism. And this kind of thing doesn't lend itself to pithy catchphrases.

Well, you run into the problem of trying to win a war against a nation-state when it's really not even a nation-state. 

The question is what is the goal of a war. To beat the other army and get them to stop waging war? Or to govern a country? 

Well, if the other army isn't really an "army" but a loose organization of people that don't like us who have lots of weapons, you can't beat the other "army" because there's no cohesive organization that can surrender. So you really can't get them to stop waging war.

And the US isn't particularly good at governing other countries. [In recent times, it might be said we're not particularly good at governing our own!] Particularly when the people of said country don't really appreciate our attempts to govern, and then become a loose organization of people that don't like us and have lots of weapons. 

It's just a hard situation without any clear line of victory but also without any coherent exit strategy. 

“[At Guadalcanal, t]he U.S. Navy lost twenty-four major warships; the Japanese lost twenty-four.  Aircraft losses too were nearly equal: America lost 436, Japan 440.  Ashore, U.S. Marine and Army killed were 1,592 . . . .  The number of Americans killed at sea topped five thousand.  Japanese deaths set a bloody pace for the rest of the war, with 20,800 soldiers lost on the island and probably 4,000 sailors at sea.

“It was the most critical major military operation America would ever run on such a threadbare shoestring. . . .  [T]he puzzle of victory was solved on the fly and on the cheap, in terms of resources if not lives.  The campaign featured tight interdependence among warriors of the air, land, and sea.  For the infantry to seize and hold the island, ships had to control the sea.  For a fleet to control the sea, the pilots had to fly from the island’s airfield.  For the pilots to fly from the airfield, the infantry had to hold the island.  That tripod stood only by the strength of all three legs. . . .  For most of the campaign, Guadalcanal was a contest of equals, perhaps the only major battle in the Pacific where the United States and Japan fought from positions of parity.  Its outcome was often in doubt.”

~ James D. Hornfischer
Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal

I am fascinated by this campaign and by what I think were some significant missed opportunities by the Japanese.  Twice the Japanese forced US Carrier units to abandon the area due to losses.  First, in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in late August, 1945 the USS Enterprise was heavily damaged and had to return to Pearl Harbor for major repairs that took nearly two months to complete.  Then at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in late October, 1942 the USS Hornet was sunk and Enterprise was damaged again.  

I believe that if the Japanese had thrown everything they had at the Island after either of those engagements they likely could have pushed the US Marines off of Guadalcanal.  This, I think, is particularly true of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.  About two weeks earlier a force of Japanese ships including BB's had devastated Henderson Field with a massive bombardment that destroyed more than half of the aircraft based there and nearly all available aviation fuel.  Then the Hornet was lost and the Enterprise heavily damaged and the US Navy had no choice but to withdraw.  In the event it that did not result in a major Japanese advantage because they also had taken damage and chose to withdraw their carrier units.  My point is that they didn't have to.  They still had two functioning CV's and they probably could have neutralized Henderson Field with a combination of carrier aircraft raids and another bombardment.  Had they done so it would have left the US without air cover over the area and at that point the Japanese would have been able to deliver their supplies and equipment and take the island.  

Of course that would not have prevented the US from eventually overwhelming the Japanese with massive amounts of ships and planes with which they simply couldn't compete.  However, militaries are large bureaucracies that tend to overcompensate for past mistakes or perceived past mistakes.  My thinking is that after a hypothetical US loss at Guadalcanal the perceived mistake would have been engaging the Japanese before overwhelming superiority could be achieved.  IMHO, that likely would have paralyzed the US in the Pacific as a "Montgomery" mindset of "don't attack until you are so overwhelming that you can't possibly lose" would have set in.  Thus, it probably would have pushed the rest of the US advances in the Pacific back by 18-24 months.  

If the US advances in the Pacific had been so delayed by about 18-24 months then at the time of the German surrender (May 8, 1945) the Japanese would have been in roughly the situation they were actually in about 18-24 months earlier so mid-to-late 1943.  Thus, when the Germans surrendered, the Japanese would still have had viable bargaining chips available.  It is, of course, impossible to know whether they would have attempted to use them or whether the Allies would have been willing to have that discussion.  The US also would likely have had to try to use A-bombs out of Chinese airfields because Guam, Saipan, and Tinian would not have been available.  

Weren't they out of the ingrediants/components for awhile?But no one but the Brass knew

Can't prove it but Uncle Joe had to have the "BOMB" in the back of his mind.Lend-lease to the Leninites was substantial but the Western Allies had long distance Bombers and the REDS supply lines were certainly stretched.And when you think about they really didn't have a reliable Ally.So even though Uncle Joe didn't show it he knew a continued conflict wasn't a winning proposition

Shit some guy in FT Worth on Antiques Road Show just had a Rodin Sculpture estimated at 450,000 smackers