It was a close run thing. The change in commander at the top had some impact I think. He was willing to commit the South Dakota and Washington in the waters around Savo Island, but that was a month later.
Henderson Field got repaired fairly quickly, and they built another air strip for fighters nearby that the Japanese didn't know about for a while.
I would hate to have been under the fire of 14" naval guns.
In addition to that, ultimately the Japanese were going to lose the war no matter what happened at Henderson Field because eventually all those SoDaks, Iowas, Baltimores, Clevelands, Alaskas, Montanas, Essexes, etc were going to show up and flat overwhelm them.
That said, I do think that the concept of Japanese victory at Guadalcanal makes for an interesting hypothetical. Suppose that, as per above, right after Santa Cruz, the IJN sends their BB's and their remaining CV to the Southern Solomons. The USN has little with which to resist so Henderson Field is obliterated, the CAF is put out of business, and the Japanese are able to resupply Guadalcanal while the US is not.
The USMC is pushed into the Solomon Sea in what would have been a bloody battle. Then what?
My theory:
King/Halsey ended up being "right" because it worked out but the troops on Guadalcanal referred to the whole thing as "Operation Shoestring" because the US wasn't really ready for such a major undertaking and the troops were chronically undersupplied.
There is a credible argument that what King/Halsey did was foolhardy because the US didn't have to be overly aggressive. Time was on our side.
Militaries are bureaucracies. Bureaucracies tend to overcompensate for past mistakes and perceived past mistakes. If the USMC had been pushed into the Solomon Sea at Guadalcanal, it would have been seen as a catastrophe born of King/Halsey's unnecessary and reckless over aggression.
The result would likely have been for the Generals and Admirals in charge of the Pacific theater to more-or-less turn themselves into clones of Bernard Montgomery and wait until they had overwhelming superiority before attempting any offensive actions. The official "Germany First" policy would have been seen as support for this course of action.
At that point, US offensives in the Pacific would have been put on hold for probably a year and a half until the first wave of Essex Class Carriers (7 commissioned by end of 1943) along with the Independence Class Light Carriers (all 9 commissioned in 1943), Iowa Class Battleships (2 commissioned in 1943) were available.
Only then (roughly end of 1943, early 1944) could the USN be completely confident that they would not encounter a superior force of IJN ships.
That would set the entire timeline of the Pacific War back by 12-18 months so that when Germany's eventual defeat became undeniably obvious the Japanese still would have held most of their conquered possessions. Some kind of deal might have been possible at that point.
