More "counter-narrative" history:
Today, May 8, 2023 is the 81st anniversary of the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea. The next major engagement after Coral Sea in the Pacific War was, of course, the Battle of Midway. I've been reading about this battle for decades and studying it more closely for several years and nothing about the Japanese plan makes sense to me.
First some background. At the beginning of WWII the USN had seven carriers, CV2 Lexington through CV8 Hornet (CV1 had been Langley but Langley was a converted oiler that was further converted to a seaplane tender in order to free up tonnage for CV7 Wasp).
Status of the US Carriers at the time of the Battle of Midway:
- CV2 Lexington was sunk at the Battle of the Coral Sea
- CV3 Saratoga suffered a torpedo hit in January, 1942 and was sent to Bremerton (Seattle) for repairs. The repairs were completed before the Battle of Midway but Saratoga was on the way from San Diego (stopped in San Diego to refuel and pick up armaments and aircraft) to Pearl Harbor when the battle was fought and arrived at Pearl Harbor on June 6, as the battle was ending.
- CV4 Ranger was not really suitable for carrier v carrier operations and was held in the Atlantic throughout almost all of WWII.
- CV5 Yorktown was damaged at Coral Sea and only available for Midway due to the herculean efforts of the repair crews at Pearl Harbor.
- CV6 Enterprise had accompanied CV8 Hornet on Doolittle's Raid thus both missed Coral Sea but both participated in Midway.
- CV7 Wasp had ferried Spitfires to Malta to assist the British in May, 1942 then was sent to Norfolk in preparation for transfer to the Pacific and was en-route from Norfolk to the Panama Canal at the time of the Battle.
- CV8 Hornet, see CV6.
The USN had three carriers available for the Battle of Midway, the three Yorktown class ships, Yorktown (CV5), Enterprise (CV6), and Hornet (CV8). The Lexington Class Saratoga (CV3) and the Wasp Class Wasp (CV7) were on their way to Pearl Harbor but neither arrived in time to participate.
The Japanese Navy *THOUGHT* they had either sunk or severely damaged Yorktown at Coral Sea and they had not detected Saratoga's return nor Wasp's transfer so they believed that the USN only had two carriers available, the two Doolittle's Raid carriers, Enterprise and Hornet.
The Japanese had six fleet carriers at the beginning of WWII. All six participated in what they referred to as the "Hawaii Operation" and what we today know as the Attack on Pearl Harbor. They also had some light and escort carriers that were less capable. They had lost one light carrier at Coral Sea but their six fleet carriers were all still intact and afloat. However, Shokaku and Zuikaku (Japan's two newest fleet carriers) did not participate in the Battle of Midway. This is an unbelievable story:
Shokaku was heavily damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea and was unavailable due to being in Kure for repairs. Zuikaku was relatively undamaged but had lost most of its airgroup. Zuikaku was held out of the Midway force because apparently nobody in Japan thought to say "Hey, why don't we take the undamaged planes from Shokaku and put them on the undamaged carrier Zuikaku?"
Thus, at the Battle of Midway the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had four carriers (the six that had attacked Pearl Harbor six months earlier less Shokaku and Zuikaku) and the United States Navy (USN) had three (the three Yorktown Class). However this overstates the advantage for the IJN because the USN carriers had larger airgroups and the USN also had an unsinkable airstrip on the Island. Thus, the USN actually had more planes.
Typically we hear of two possible motivations for the Japanese attack on Midway:
- To expand their defensive perimeter - partially in response to Doolittle's Raid, and
- To "force" the USN to send their carriers out to defend and thus battle and destroy the USN's carriers.
These aren't necessarily complimentary and neither of them make sense.
Before I address Japan's motivations, let me explain that it was only because of codebreaking that the USN was prepared for the attack on Midway. The garrison at Midway had been reinforced, repairs to Yorktown were expedited, and all three available carriers were sent to the vicinity ONLY because the USN KNEW the attack was coming. Otherwise the following would definitely have been true:
- Yorktown would NOT have been available. It would either have been under repair at Pearl Harbor or in transit to the West Coast for major repairs.
- Midway would NOT have been reinforced.
- Saratoga would not have been rushed back to Pearl (arrived June 6), the original orders were for it to await the arrival of an Admiral, THEN depart San Diego.
Considering that most of the fighting at that point was in the South Pacific, the remaining USN carriers (which would ONLY have been Enterprise and Hornet) would most likely have been in the South Pacific.
All that being said, if the USN had been unaware of the IJN's plans to attack Midway, the IJN would almost certainly have captured the Atoll.
Now regarding the alleged Japanese motivations for the attack, first to expand their defensive perimeter:
This make no sense because the IJN simply didn't have the available transport capacity to maintain a garrison on Midway. The troops and planes stationed on Midway would have needed food, fuel, and ammunition and Midway is 2,500 miles from Tokyo. Additionally, Midway isn't very close to anything else that the Japanese possessed so it would have been completely unsupported and the supply runs couldn't have been readily combined with resupplying anything else.
Midway is ~1,300 mi from Hawaii so the USN would have had a field day sinking IJN transports. They and the garrison would have been attacked at will by USN submarines, aircraft, and surface ships. The Japanese would have found themselves in an attritional warfare situation that would have been catastrophic to their cause.
Finally, once the USN got serious about retaking Midway, the IJN couldn't possibly have defended it. Their closest possession would have been Wake Island which isn't particularly large and is ~1,200 miles away. That is too far for air support.
The other traditional motivation given for the Japanese attack was to draw the USN carriers into battle such that they could be destroyed. One problem with this is that it relies on the USN making a strategically insane decision. Assuming that the US only had two carriers (Japanese intelligence assessment prior to Midway) and that both of them were in the South Pacific, they couldn't have gotten to Midway until after it fell anyway. At that point, assuming the two USN carriers charged to Midway, they'd have been facing ridiculous odds of two carriers vs four carriers PLUS the island. Further, the USN would OBVIOUSLY have known this since the USN garrison at Midway would have KNOWN they were under carrier air attack and relayed that information on to Pearl before they fell.
In a somewhat analogous situation six months earlier the USN had sent a relief force to Wake Island when it was attacked shortly after Pearl Harbor. However, when IJN carriers approached Wake the USN recalled the relief force because it simply wasn't worth losing a carrier to defend Wake. Midway would have been no different. Beyond that, assuming the two USN carriers HAD been in the South Pacific they probably couldn't have made it to Midway before the IJN carriers ran low on fuel and had to depart anyway. The Yorktowns had a maximum speed of a little over 30 knots or a little under 40 MPH. Assuming they were ~2,000 miles away in the South Pacific, they'd have had to travel back to Pearl Harbor then refueled and rearmed, then traveled ~1,300 miles to Midway. That 3,300 miles of travel would have taken more than three days even assuming that they went full speed the whole way and didn't bother to zig-zag. Add in time to realize what was happening at Midway before the order was given and time to refuel/rearm at Pearl and you are getting awfully close to the endurance limit of IJN carriers.
Understand here that the IJN was simply incapable of stationing their carriers off Midway indefinitely. No Navy in the world was capable of doing that in the early part of WWII. Late in the war the US developed the capability to station carriers off a hostile shore and maintain them there but in the early part of the war carriers of all navies were capable of raids (Taranto, Pearl Harbor, Marshalls, etc) and of briefly supporting amphibious operations but they were NOT capable of standing off a hostile shore. Even assuming a successful IJN invasion of Midway, the IJN carriers were going to have to go home sooner rather than later for lack of fuel and munitions. They couldn't just wait indefinitely for an American counterattack that might or might not develop.
Finally, everybody on both sides KNEW that the IJN carriers couldn't simply wait at Midway indefinitely. If the USN had viewed Midway as a critical strategic outpost (they didn't) they would have KNOWN that the IJN carriers would have to leave eventually. It would have been colossally stupid to send Enterprise and Hornet up there alone while the IJN Carriers were still there. Instead, Nimitz would have expedited Saratoga (at San Diego) and Wasp (at Norfolk) and waited for the IJN Carriers to depart the area. Then he could have sent four of his own carriers to retake Midway with his choice of timing.
