CFB51 College Football Fan Community
The Power Five => Big Ten => Topic started by: Cincydawg on July 20, 2019, 10:21:24 AM
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https://www.livescience.com/42716-epic-battles-that-changed-history.html (https://www.livescience.com/42716-epic-battles-that-changed-history.html)
One list. I think I'd substitute a few into the list:
Fall of Constantinople
Relief of the Siege of Vienna
Caesar and Vercingitorix?
Edington
I don't think Napoleon's invasion of Russia would "count", and the one major battle fought was not really determinant.(Borodino)
I would think about Trenton as more significant than Yorktown.
Anyway, I'm pondering battles that COULD have gone the other way and the ramifications would have been climactic.
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A pretty good list.
I'd add Antietam. A Confederate victory likely would have secured British and French recognition and assistance. The actual tactical stalemate was in fact a strategic victory that enabled Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation from a position of strength rather than weakness, for all practical purposes foreclosing British and French support.
I think Antietam was more significant than Gettysburg. I might even argue that Grant's Vicksburg campaign was more significant than Gettysburg.
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Antietam. A Confederate victory likely would have secured British and French recognition and assistance.
Was there much chance of a Confederate victory though? I suppose an alternative is if Lee's orders had not been found and McClellan moved even slower than he did.
I suppose then the site of the battle would change to somewhere else, maybe Gettysburg ...
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Yeah, a Confederate victory likely would have taken place at a different location, but Lee had beaten McClellan earlier that year in the Seven Days battles with far weaker forces than he had at Antietam.
Even if Lee had not fought a decisive battle no northern soil in the fall of 1862, had he been able to rampage through Pennsylvania, extorting tribute from northern cities, burning northern bridges, tearing up northern railroad tracks, capturing runaway slaves and free blacks and taking them back to the South in slavery, and then escape back to Virginia with a supply of northern foodstuffs, weapons, horses and wagons, that might have been enough to bring about the foreign recognition.
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My personal opinion is any Civil War battle shouldn't be on the lost. Reason: even if the confederacy had won, in some strange reality, there would have been another war within 20 years to the same purpose and ends, and what resulted would have resulted if there would have been one, two, three or more wars.... it's fortunate there was only one and so we wouldn't have been so weakened as a nation another nation could easily take us out.
Outside of that and using the same logic, it narrows the battles that truly impacted world history down to those that truly altered trajectories of empires.
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I thought this was going to be a list like
1971 Nebraska vs Oklahoma
1993 FSU vs Notre Dame
Silly me.
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The Seven Days battles of course were tactically relatively indecisive. Malvern Hill was a southern disaster of a sort. I know McClellan was being fed a line about the South having 200,000 troops. It was weird that Pope would try and come south while McClellan's forces were still en route. Problem with wanting glory instead of results.
There are some battles in history like Cannae that were astonishing in a tactical sense but later led to a strategic defeat. Invading Russia seems like a bad idea.
Imagine the Nazis had been able to take the Caucasus and just wall of Stalingrad as they did Leningrad and the oil dries up for the Soviets.
I don't know if they really could have done that longer term.
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The Seven Days battles illustrate something interesting, one commander defeating the other commander without defeating his troops. Tactically, the Union won more than it lost in the Seven Days. Strategically, McClellan (always ready and willing to believe that he was outnumbered 2 to 1 when the reverse was true) was beaten back even has his subordinates were giving better than they got.
McClellan should have been court-martialed for dereliction of duty and abandoning his command after that little campaign.
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McClellan is a very odd duck to me. Lincoln turned to him again after this mess and he could have ended the war at Antietam, most think, had he put all his troops into the attack instead of piecemealing it. He had Lee up against a river with only part of his army assembled, admittedly in a solid defensive position.
Council of fears.
That would be a good name for a book, sort of Tom Clancy like.
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McClellan is a very odd duck to me. Lincoln turned to him again after this mess and he could have ended the war at Antietam, most think, had he put all his troops into the attack instead of piecemealing it. He had Lee up against a river with only part of his army assembled, admittedly in a solid defensive position.
Council of fears.
That would be a good name for a book, sort of Tom Clancy like.
:57:
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The Seven Days battles illustrate something interesting, one commander defeating the other commander without defeating his troops. Tactically, the Union won more than it lost in the Seven Days. Strategically, McClellan (always ready and willing to believe that he was outnumbered 2 to 1 when the reverse was true) was beaten back even has his subordinates were giving better than they got.
What did Lincoln say? Something like "if I gave him a million men,he'd swear the enemy had 2,and he'd lay down kicking and screaming for 3"
CWS what did Stalin tell the Japanese about Anglo-American intentions? - you mentioned this
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Lincoln said something like "If you're not going to use the army, maybe I could borrow it" or somesuch.
Not going after Lee at Antietam when he was trying to retreat back across the Potomac ......
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Oh,Old Abe tried everything and said both of those.McClellan was reincarnated in the form of Montgomery - do very little,deflect all blame and weasel in on the credit
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I was thinking perhaps the naval action between the French and British off Yorktown were significant also.
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. . . CWS what did Stalin tell the Japanese about Anglo-American intentions? - you mentioned this
Stalin wanted to prolong the Pacific War so that he could get his forces moved to the east. He wanted to capture southern Sakhalin Island (the Japanese half) and Hokkaido, and occupy the Kuril Islands. He did not want Japan to surrender before he accomplished this. One of the things he did was tell the Japanese about the U.S. plans to invade the Philippines. It was not automatic that the U.S. would do so--there were arguments within our own councils that bypassing the Philippines would be a smarter move. This meant that the Japanese could keep and even reinforce their forces in the Philippines, confident that they would not be bypassed and allowed to die on the vine, rather than pulling them back to the home islands.
He also encouraged the Japanese to believe that he could help them negotiate a less-than-unconditional surrender to the Western Allies. All the time, he was planning to violate the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact as soon as feasible.
So Stalin was playing a game with his allies, telling us that he would join us in the war on Japan within 90 days of the German surrender while at the same time giving the Japanese information of American plans and also providing them with reasons to believe that he could help broker a better deal for them, and playing a game with Japan in that his diplomats specifically told them that the USSR would honor the Neutrality Pact until its expiration date in 1946 even as he was making the military preparations to invade their northern islands.
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I've gotten into some rather spirited exchanges with some British Slappies in youtube comment sections.They were blathering on Japan threw in the towel because the Russians were on their way.When I explained the Russians did less than the British in the Pacific and their fleet of trawlers would still be steaming to get there,well that was not well received
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Actually, the Soviets did invade southern Sakhalin and the Kurils at some point before the formal surrender ceremonies took place, and their last combat operations took place on, IIRC, 5 Sep 45, three days after the signing of the Instrument of Surrender.
Still, your main point is valid. The Brits, for one thing, fought the Japanese in India and Burma. For another, in 1945 they operated a carrier task force that was an element of the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38/58) of the U.S. Navy.
The Soviets did nothing that helped the overall effort in the Pacific. All they did is hop in at the end and grab territory in Manchuria and at the northern reaches of the Japanese archipelago. Beating the Japanese in Manchuria was a massive undertaking, but it was against an army that was all but beaten by that point.
There's an argument out there that the Soviet declaration of war on 8 August, and its subsequent attacks beginning early the next morning are what drove the Japanese to surrender. To that, I would respond by asking why the Soviets suddenly got off their butts, 2 days after the Hiroshima bombing, when they had spent the previous two years encouraging the Japanese to keep holding out for a less-than-unconditional surrender.
What's a "slappie," MrNubbz?
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India & Burma were British interests and strategically didn't matter a whole lot except for their morale.ANZAC territory was defended by the USA,with of course the locals contributing what they could.Slappie is a stooge more/less,some of the limeys I've crossed swords with are revisionist - distorians changing the narrative 75 yrs after the fact.With out lend/lease and loans the Crown buckles in 1942 - this according to Hastings/Beevor/Barr.
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India and Burma were important to us in that they were the staging bases for our aid to China.
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China was lost anyway and besides after the Island hopping,fire bombing and 2 A-Bombs.Those troops would die on the vine
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There's an argument out there that the Soviet declaration of war on 8 August, and its subsequent attacks beginning early the next morning are what drove the Japanese to surrender. To that, I would respond by asking why the Soviets suddenly got off their butts, 2 days after the Hiroshima bombing, when they had spent the previous two years encouraging the Japanese to keep holding out for a less-than-unconditional surrender.
To be fair to Stalin, he had promised to declare war on Japan within 90 days of the German surrender and the Germans surrendered on May 8. Three months later Stalin's T34's rolled into Manchuko.
That said, I agree wholeheartedly with your assessment of Stalin and his motivations in 1945 but I just wanted to point out that, for what it is worth, he did honor the letter of his 90 day agreement.
As far as the British in the Pacific are concerned, the story of what was called the "British Pacific Fleet" is interesting:
By any standard other than comparison to the US Pacific Fleet, the BPF was humongous. It was arguably the most powerful fleet ever assembled by the RN consisting of:
- 4 BB's
- 6 CV's
- 15 CVE's and CVL's
- 11 CA and CL's
- innumerable DD's, DE's, subs support ships, and other smaller ships
I've read that most of the British Cabinet didn't want to send it because it would be so obviously a junior partner to the vastly larger US Fleet but Churchill overruled them because he felt it was important for Britain to contribute to the inevitable US victory in the Pacific.
The British carriers carried much smaller air-wings than their US counterparts but they were better defended against kamikaze attacks with their armored decks (US Carriers had unarmored decks and if you want to know why I'll explain the thinking behind it).
Back to the Russians:
I honestly don't know that Stalin's maneuvers accomplished much. The US was, of course, reading all of the Japanese communications back-and-forth with their ambassador in Moscow. When you read what Tokyo was saying, it is astounding. They were telling their ambassador to offer things that they had already lost to the US, as "carrots" to get the US to end the war. The Ambassador in Moscow had a clearer picture of reality and this put him in a difficult spot because he was being asked to try to negotiate something that was laughable on its face.
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Back to the OP, IMHO the most consequential battle in history is the Battle of Tours. The Battle of Tours was fought on October 10, 732 between European Christian forces under Charles Martel and Middle Eastern and North African Islamic forces under Abdul Rahman Al Ghafiqi.
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not a battle were any blood was shed, but cracking the German Enigma code was very significant
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Battle of Tours was on the cited link's list, so I didn't call it out specifically.
The Battle of Assaye was significant in one way, it gave the British a young general who would later do some remarkable things.
He said that was his best battle.
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That's hindsight, though. We devoted a lot of resources to keeping China in the war. And to propping up Chiang Kai-shek.
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To be fair to Stalin, he had promised to declare war on Japan within 90 days of the German surrender and the Germans surrendered on May 8. Three months later Stalin's T34's rolled into Manchuko.
That said, I agree wholeheartedly with your assessment of Stalin and his motivations in 1945 but I just wanted to point out that, for what it is worth, he did honor the letter of his 90 day agreement.
Stalin fully complied with about three agreements. He complied with the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, even as his advisors were telling him that the Germans were preparing for a major offensive. He complied with the requirement to give a year's warning that he would no renew the Neutrality Pact with Japan (although he then went and broke it before it expired). And he complied with his promise to enter the war against Japan with 2-3 months after the German surrender.
As far as the British in the Pacific are concerned, the story of what was called the "British Pacific Fleet" is interesting:
By any standard other than comparison to the US Pacific Fleet, the BPF was humongous. It was arguably the most powerful fleet ever assembled by the RN consisting of:
- 4 BB's
- 6 CV's
- 15 CVE's and CVL's
- 11 CA and CL's
- innumerable DD's, DE's, subs support ships, and other smaller ships
I've read that most of the British Cabinet didn't want to send it because it would be so obviously a junior partner to the vastly larger US Fleet but Churchill overruled them because he felt it was important for Britain to contribute to the inevitable US victory in the Pacific.
The British carriers carried much smaller air-wings than their US counterparts but they were better defended against kamikaze attacks with their armored decks (US Carriers had unarmored decks and if you want to know why I'll explain the thinking behind it).
Sure--go ahead. I know that their carriers were built to that different philosophy, but I don't know that I've read (or remember) the rationale behind it. Maybe because the Germans had not much of a naval air threat?
Back to the Russians:
I honestly don't know that Stalin's maneuvers accomplished much. The US was, of course, reading all of the Japanese communications back-and-forth with their ambassador in Moscow. When you read what Tokyo was saying, it is astounding. They were telling their ambassador to offer things that they had already lost to the US, as "carrots" to get the US to end the war. The Ambassador in Moscow had a clearer picture of reality and this put him in a difficult spot because he was being asked to try to negotiate something that was laughable on its face.
I wonder if the Japanese officials instructing their Ambassador in Moscow even knew the extent of Japanese losses in the Pacific. That information was pretty closely held.
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Sure--go ahead. I know that their carriers were built to that different philosophy, but I don't know that I've read (or remember) the rationale behind it. Maybe because the Germans had not much of a naval air threat?
I wonder if the Japanese officials instructing their Ambassador in Moscow even knew the extent of Japanese losses in the Pacific. That information was pretty closely held.
Armored decks were a trade-off. Armor is heavy (obviously) and the deck is substantially above the waterline which means that in addition to the overall weight problem, armored decks also hamper stability.
The American answer to this conundrum at least when the Essex class was designed was to build carriers with lightweight wooden decks and use the weight savings to better armor the "strength deck" which was below the hangars. Thus, it was REALLY hard to put a bomb into a boiler room or magazine of an Essex (because the bomb needed to penetrate the unarmored flight deck, the unarmored deck between the two levels of hangars, and the armored strength deck. This is part of the reason that no Essex class carriers were EVER sunk in combat. It also meant that the American Essex Class carriers could carry a substantially larger air-wing.
During WWII the American Essex Class Carriers displaced about 36,000 tons at full load and carried around 100 aircraft of various types. The British Illustrious Class Carriers displaced about 23,000 tons and carried up to 57 aircraft. That isn't an entirely fair comparison because the Essex Class Carriers were larger but if you do the math, the Essex's carried approximately one aircraft for each 360 tons of displacement while the Illustrious's carried approximately one aircraft for each 403 tons of displacement. I also think that comparison shorts the unarmored US carriers a bit because wiki lists the Illustrious as carrying 36-57 planes while the Essex is listed as carrying 90-100. Later in the war I know the US started adding extra planes (mostly fighters and night-fighters for defense) so I think the US Carriers actually had a bigger disparity.
More planes made the carriers more potent because obviously the main defensive and offensive armament of a CV is the planes.
Armored deck carriers were also harder to fix when they did get damaged. US crews simply planked over the holes and kept fighting.
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I wonder if the Japanese officials instructing their Ambassador in Moscow even knew the extent of Japanese losses in the Pacific. That information was pretty closely held.
They had to. The people giving those instructions were the Cabinet.
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I'd add Antietam. A Confederate victory likely would have secured British and French recognition and assistance. The actual tactical stalemate was in fact a strategic victory that enabled Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation from a position of strength rather than weakness, for all practical purposes foreclosing British and French support.
This brings up what I think is a really interesting follow-on hypothetical:
Suppose the Confederates win at Antietam and that the British and French follow that up with recognition and aid to the fledgling Confederacy. At that point it becomes reasonably possible that Lincoln loses the election of 1864 to a "peace" candidate (probably not the losing McClellan). Ok, so the effort to secede proves successful and the US is split into a Northern United States of America and a Southern Confederate States of America.
WWI was only 50 years later. Even in the actual event there was a lot of support in the North for the Central Powers largely because there were a lot of first and second generation immigrants from those countries and first and second generation Irish who didn't care for Great Britain. Without the more Anglophilic South to balance that, perhaps the United States (the northern part) enters the war on Germany and Austria's side. Conversely, the Confederates who would have owed their independence to Britain and France may well have joined on their side. Thus you end up with WWI being fought in trenches in Northern Virginia as well as Eastern France. Without US support, does the French army collapse? Do the Central Powers and the United States win WWI? Then what?
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My guess is history changes so much, none of that happens. Part of the reason for the US going to war was the German cable to Mexico. That would have annoyed the South, not the North. My guess is that the South might have split further over 50 years. A state could get into a snit over whatever and say Bye.
East Tennessee was not supportive of the Confederacy in the main, nor were any of the mountainous area of GA/NC/VA. WV might have "grown" a few counties.
Texas might have said Bye.
Wilson ran for reelection on a peac platform but that changed in 1917 with unrestricted submarine warfare and the encouragement of Mexico to attack us. We could have stayed out of it entirely. It might not have happened either of course. Some think the States would have found a way to recombine. A major issue was the status of the territories whether slave of free. If the South had been assured by an Amendment that slavery would be protected they might have rejoined.
And the North had a LOT of German immigrants by 1917 as well. Cincinnati was very Germanic.
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There was a canal through downtown Cincinnati that went north in the 19th century. North of that canal was an area still called "Over the Rhine" or OTR where the Germans largely settled. They had schools that taught only in German. The canal was replaced circa 1928 with a subway which was about 65% finished when they ran out of money and the roof was turned into Kaiser Wilhelm Strasse, renamed Central Avernue before WW I. A lot of street names were changed.
One now is Pete Rose Way named after some baseball player.
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Armored decks were a trade-off. Armor is heavy (obviously) and the deck is substantially above the waterline which means that in addition to the overall weight problem, armored decks also hamper stability.
The American answer to this conundrum at least when the Essex class was designed was to build carriers with lightweight wooden decks and use the weight savings to better armor the "strength deck" which was below the hangars. Thus, it was REALLY hard to put a bomb into a boiler room or magazine of an Essex (because the bomb needed to penetrate the unarmored flight deck, the unarmored deck between the two levels of hangars, and the armored strength deck. This is part of the reason that no Essex class carriers were EVER sunk in combat. It also meant that the American Essex Class carriers could carry a substantially larger air-wing.
During WWII the American Essex Class Carriers displaced about 36,000 tons at full load and carried around 100 aircraft of various types. The British Illustrious Class Carriers displaced about 23,000 tons and carried up to 57 aircraft. That isn't an entirely fair comparison because the Essex Class Carriers were larger but if you do the math, the Essex's carried approximately one aircraft for each 360 tons of displacement while the Illustrious's carried approximately one aircraft for each 403 tons of displacement. I also think that comparison shorts the unarmored US carriers a bit because wiki lists the Illustrious as carrying 36-57 planes while the Essex is listed as carrying 90-100. Later in the war I know the US started adding extra planes (mostly fighters and night-fighters for defense) so I think the US Carriers actually had a bigger disparity.
More planes made the carriers more potent because obviously the main defensive and offensive armament of a CV is the planes.
Armored deck carriers were also harder to fix when they did get damaged. US crews simply planked over the holes and kept fighting.
That's a great exposition, Medina. I agree with it completely.
I thought that you were going to tell WHY the Brits made the trade-offs that they did.
Another way of looking at it is the age-old weighing of offense vs. defense that we also see in tanks and aircraft. The U.S. carriers carried more offensive combat power whereas the British carriers were at least theoretically more survivable. There's an easily understood comparison between the Japanese A6M Zero fighter and the U.S. Navy's F4F Wildcat fighter. The Zero was all offense. It had long range, higher top speed, better maneuverability, and heavier armament than the Wildcat. But it was lightly constructed and didn't have self-sealing fuel tanks. The Wilcat, OTOH, was slower, less maneuverable, shorter ranged, and less heavily armed. But it was tough. It was built stronger and it had self-sealing fuel tanks.
As is often the case with trade-offs, the victor was often the side that made the most of its strengths while minimizing its weaknesses. The Japanese did that better at the start of the Pacific War, not really consciously, but because the Zero was a fighter pilots fighter plane. Fighter pilots want to dogfight, and that played right into the hands of the Zero pilots. Wildcat pilots had to learn to use tactics that would let them survive and win against the Zero that had all the better specs. They learned (as the Flying Tigers had in China) that American fighters could outdive Japanese fighters, so the way to attack them was to strike from above and dive away. Not only could they dive faster, but they could maneuver better at high speeds, because the Zero's controls were designed to maximize maneuverability at low-to-medium speeds--they got very stiff at high speeds. (The Flying Tigers had assumed that they were fighting Zeroes, but their opponents might have been Japanese Army fighters instead. It didn't matter; the principle was the same.)
Also, Cdr. John Thach developed the "beam defense" (a.k.a. "Thach Weave") tactic of flying with the flight leader and his wingman flying spread out, roughly abreast. If either were attacked from the rear, they would both towards each other, which would give the plane not being attacked a clear shot at the Zero chasing the other plane. That worked with larger flormations as well--one pair of Wildcats would fly abreast of another pair, and the same principle applied on a larger scale.
Finally, the Zero's heavier armament (2x23mm + 2x7.7mm vs. 4 or 6x.50-cal)) didn't really matter. The Wildcat could take a lot of punishment and keep flying. The Zero could take much less--in some case, a single burst of .50-caliber machine-gun fire.
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The tank design trade off thing fascinates me as well. Everyone in WW Two had tank destroyers, basically anti-tank guns mounted on some kind of chassis often with no turret. (The Japanese didn't have much armor of any type, some lighter tanks.)
The French had more and heavier tanks in 1940 than did the attacking Germans but they largely had no radios so they coordinated with flags. Um, yeah. The Germans were still using the light Panzer II with a 20 mm main gun that could not penetrate decent armor. The French Char bis 2B tank was almost impenetrable by any German tank gun at any angle and the Somua 35 S was at least equal to the early Panzer III. The Panzer IV had a short barrel gun intended to help infantry attacks.
The French managed almost no counterattacks on the thin German advance. The British managed one fairly good one that gave Rommel quite the fright but it was unsupported and uncoordinated. And of course the Germans was astonished by the Russian more modern tanks, the T-34 and the ponderous KV series. The Panther looks quite a bit like the T-34 for obvious reasons.
I read that the US had developed a cheap way to provide higher octane fuel than the Germans could make, which enabled higher compression in aircraft engines and thus more power. I forget now the technique, but it was an advantage later in the war. Our Cessnas would run on "100LL", which was 100 octane Low Lead" aviation fuel.
The engine still operated at something like 6.5:1 compression though, without any turbo. It was a huge 4 cylinder boxer air cooled engine with 180 hp.
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The Zero was all offense. It had long range, higher top speed, better maneuverability, and heavier armament than the Wildcat. But it was lightly constructed and didn't have self-sealing fuel tanks. The Wilcat, OTOH, was slower, less maneuverable, shorter ranged, and less heavily armed. But it was tough. It was built stronger and it had self-sealing fuel tanks.
I've known for years that the Zero didn't have self-sealing tanks and that American fighters did, but I only recently learned WHY. I always thought that EVERYONE would want self-sealing tanks so I guess I just assumed that the Japanese either didn't have the requisite technology or that they didn't have the requisite materials. That was not correct. The Zero lacked self-sealing tanks due to a conscious decision made by Japanese designers. Self-sealing tanks had less capacity because all that self-sealing goo takes up space that is therefore unavailable for fuel. The Japanese made a decision to do without self-sealing tanks in order to increase range.
They learned (as the Flying Tigers had in China) that American fighters could outdive Japanese fighters, so the way to attack them was to strike from above and dive away. Not only could they dive faster, but they could maneuver better at high speeds, because the Zero's controls were designed to maximize maneuverability at low-to-medium speeds--they got very stiff at high speeds. (The Flying Tigers had assumed that they were fighting Zeroes, but their opponents might have been Japanese Army fighters instead. It didn't matter; the principle was the same.)
Also, Cdr. John Thach developed the "beam defense" (a.k.a. "Thach Weave") tactic of flying with the flight leader and his wingman flying spread out, roughly abreast. If either were attacked from the rear, they would both towards each other, which would give the plane not being attacked a clear shot at the Zero chasing the other plane. That worked with larger flormations as well--one pair of Wildcats would fly abreast of another pair, and the same principle applied on a larger scale.
Finally, the Zero's heavier armament (2x23mm + 2x7.7mm vs. 4 or 6x.50-cal)) didn't really matter. The Wildcat could take a lot of punishment and keep flying. The Zero could take much less--in some case, a single burst of .50-caliber machine-gun fire.
It is amazing that Chennault (Flying Tiger commander)* didn't do a better job of getting the US Army and Navy up to speed on the strengths and weaknesses of the various Japanese aircraft. Instead the Navy had to learn all of the same lessons that the Flying Tigers had already learned.
John Thach deserves all the recognition he got, his "weave" defense really changed the balance of power in the skies over the Pacific.
Similarly, Army Air Corp P38 pilots learned quickly that their enormous twin-engine fighters stood no chance against a Zero in a turning dogfight but they had a speed advantage (especially in a dive) and they could use that to keep their distance and make wide passes and blast away at Japanese aircraft as they flew by.
*I assumed that you ( @CWSooner (https://www.cfb51.com/index.php?action=profile;u=1544) ) know who Claire Chennault was but I wanted to explain it for other potential readers.
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The French had more and heavier tanks in 1940 than did the attacking Germans but they largely had no radios so they coordinated with flags. Um, yeah. The Germans were still using the light Panzer II with a 20 mm main gun that could not penetrate decent armor. The French Char bis 2B tank was almost impenetrable by any German tank gun at any angle and the Somua 35 S was at least equal to the early Panzer III. The Panzer IV had a short barrel gun intended to help infantry attacks.
The French managed almost no counterattacks on the thin German advance. The British managed one fairly good one that gave Rommel quite the fright but it was unsupported and uncoordinated.
In addition to design and the lack of radios, the French were not using the superior tactics, blitzkrieg as it was called. The French thought that the lesson of WWI was that it was FAR better to be on the defensive in strong fortified positions and let your enemy expend himself attacking. Their tanks were basically considered to be an infantry weapon so they were parceled out with infantry units. German tanks, by contrast, were massed at the point of attack to overwhelm the defenders and get into the enemy's rear where they could cut off supplies and surround opposing armies.
Toward the end of the war the American Army REALLY refined and improved those blitzkrieg tactics by putting relatively low-level tankers and infantrymen in communication with local ground-attack aircraft.
FWIW:
At the beginning of WWII pretty much everybody assumed that tanks were anti-infantry weapons so they were not equipped with weapons large enough to take out enemy tanks. That was a separate job for anti-tank guns that were not heavily armored (or not armored at all) because they were not supposed to be beyond the front lines. The experience of the war showed that tanks often fought each other and thus needed weapons large enough to take out enemy tanks.
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The Germans apparently never used the term "blitzkrieg". I think the Brits coined the term.
It's really just combined arms warfare.
The French wanted to fight on the defensive and in Belgium. They were locked into that concept and couldn't adjust.
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The armor versus speed concept is common throughout history. Battleships versus battle cruisers comes to mind also.
The A-10 Warthog is perhaps the most heavily armored aircraft in recent history. The F-35 is "armored" using stealth instead of literal armor.
Modern tanks today are "main battle tanks" and the concept of a TD is almost nonexistent. I think modern naval ships are nearly unarmored.
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I've known for years that the Zero didn't have self-sealing tanks and that American fighters did, but I only recently learned WHY. I always thought that EVERYONE would want self-sealing tanks so I guess I just assumed that the Japanese either didn't have the requisite technology or that they didn't have the requisite materials. That was not correct. The Zero lacked self-sealing tanks due to a conscious decision made by Japanese designers. Self-sealing tanks had less capacity because all that self-sealing goo takes up space that is therefore unavailable for fuel. The Japanese made a decision to do without self-sealing tanks in order to increase range. It is amazing that Chennault (Flying Tiger commander)* didn't do a better job of getting the US Army and Navy up to speed on the strengths and weaknesses of the various Japanese aircraft. Instead the Navy had to learn all of the same lessons that the Flying Tigers had already learned.
John Thach deserves all the recognition he got, his "weave" defense really changed the balance of power in the skies over the Pacific.
Similarly, Army Air Corp P38 pilots learned quickly that their enormous twin-engine fighters stood no chance against a Zero in a turning dogfight but they had a speed advantage (especially in a dive) and they could use that to keep their distance and make wide passes and blast away at Japanese aircraft as they flew by.
*I assumed that you ( @CWSooner (https://www.cfb51.com/index.php?action=profile;u=1544) ) know who Claire Chennault was but I wanted to explain it for other potential readers.
On the subject of self-sealing fuel tanks, we didn't have them in our planes when WWII began in Europe. It was one of the things the Brits and French didn't like about the planes they bought from us. So we learned from them.
You and CD discussed the French tanks upthread. I would add to what you two said by noting that most French tanks didn't have a commander's cupola, so it was harder for French tank commanders to acquire and track targets.
Back to airplanes, the most numerous fighter in the Armée de l'Air when the Germans invaded in May 1940 was the American Curtiss Hawk (P-36 export model). It also shot down the most German airplanes of any fighter the French had.
Claire Chennault's reports of Japanese aerial prowess were mostly ignored because he had burned all his bridges in the Army, and because the Army and Navy didn't talk to each other very much. Also, by the time he could provide credible combat reports--the Flying Tigers didn't go into combat until a couple of weeks after after Pearl Harbor--Army and Navy pilots were also encountering the Zero, and learning their hard lessons.
This might surprise you, Medina. Or maybe not. Chennault's son John commanded the 11th Fighter Squadron, 343rd Fighter Group, in the Aleutians campaign. His P-40s were painted with a tiger-head insignia and the unit called itself the Aleutian Tigers.
(https://www.flyingmag.com/resizer/I94KvcCQ8Rxvc_2Og5grSvbgvPQ=/1000x674/arc-anglerfish-arc2-prod-bonnier.s3.amazonaws.com/public/VCCH5V2EN5YZMMUHRNB56OOEU4.jpg)
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And the North had a LOT of German immigrants by 1917 as well.
Ya,Schlitz,Stroh,Pabst,Busch,Miller,Hamm,Schmidts,Moerlein,Yuengling
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The Russians had some nice aircraft in WW Two also. They tended to be short legged a bit because they didn't need much range.
The German Fw-190D was an excellent interceptor.
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The OP list evokes the difference between winning battles and winning wars. Wars generally have strategic purposes that are much different than holding a particular piece of land--Clausewitz's view of war as an extension of politics and all that. The aim of war is generally to subdue, not destroy, the enemy, but--of course--that often requires a fair amount of destruction.
Souring a populace on fighting the war is often more effective than winning on a battlefield. I'm of the opinion (not well founded) that assuming motivated states, the better supplied and equipped (e.g., the side with more resources) will win the war, but that's a big assumption--the motivation to continue fighting often trumps resources. Both overcome battlefield tactics.
The battle that tactically changes the tide of war is rare. As we were discussing earlier, it is unlikely that an allied disaster on D-Day would ultimately have lead to a German victory, only that it would have prolonged the war. Cannae--everyone's favorite Roman battle--couldn't save Carthage. The Siege of Orleans didn't result in the French winning the war. And while Yorktown was the culmination of the Revolutionary War, it neither ended it, nor was it necessarily the most important victory in the war (though surely it was important).
Of course, victory and valor are powerful recruiting tools, so undoubtedly help maintain or grow a people's motivation to fight.
And on a totally separate note, while there haven't been many tank destroyers in the WWII sense, all developed armies have tank destroyers, they just don't carry that moniker. AT missiles are more and more effective and are carried on all sorts of vehicles (certainly a great improvement over the "bazooka"). And, particularly as munitions continue to make heavy enough armor difficult to come by, fast, lightly armored vehicles carrying anti-tank weapons seem to be proliferating.
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The Russians had some nice aircraft in WW Two also. They tended to be short legged a bit because they didn't need much range.
The German Fw-190D was an excellent interceptor.
Necessity is the mother of invention.
The Russian and German fighters tended to have MUCH shorter ranges than the American and British fighters because the Russians and Germans either had airfields very close to the front lines or were defending their own cities so they didn't need long range. The Americans and British wanted to be able to send fighters to escort their long range 4-engine bombers on bombing missions deep in enemy territory so they developed long range fighters up to the task.
Then there is the Pacific theater: Naval aircraft pretty much inherently needed long range so both the US and the Japanese developed long range carrier-based fighters. However, later in the war one of the main issues that the US had to deal with was the Kamikaze threat. For that they didn't need long range fighters but they needed REALLY FAST and REALLY well armed fighters and at the end of the war the US Pacific fleet had some incredibly capable fighters for this role.
Another range comparison:
If you are ever in Chicago I highly recommend the Museum of Science and Industry. They have a German WWII U-boat, the U505 in the museum. The story of the capture of the U505 and the fact that the US Navy's high command was actually VERY unhappy about it (because, unbeknownst to the commander on the scene, the US had already cracked the German code and the brass was afraid that the Germans would find out we captured on of their submarines and change their code) is fascinating.
Anyway, tour the U505 then tour any one of the innumerable US WWII submarines that can be found all over the US and note the difference. The German submarine is tiny compared to the US submarines. The reason is simply that the Atlantic is a LOT smaller than the Pacific. The German subs didn't have to travel as far so they didn't need to carry as much fuel and provisions so they were smaller. The American submarines had to travel much, much farther so they needed a lot more space for fuel and provisions so they were much larger.
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I'm of the opinion (not well founded) that assuming motivated states, the better supplied and equipped (e.g., the side with more resources) will win the war, but that's a big assumption--the motivation to continue fighting often trumps resources. Both overcome battlefield tactics.
I agree with your whole post and I think it is well stated but I wanted to focus on this. I agree 100%. Barring some oddity like the less well supplied side destroying the other side VERY quickly or the more well supplied side not having the will power to fight on to victory the more well supplied/equipped side will eventually win. Everything else (valor, strategy, tactics, etc) will generally just determine how long that victory takes.
That is why I took the position in the D-Day thread that I just didn't think even a major catastrophe would have changed the end result of the war. By that time the Allies had the ability to just regroup and try again.
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I agree with your whole post and I think it is well stated but I wanted to focus on this. I agree 100%. Barring some oddity like the less well supplied side destroying the other side VERY quickly or the more well supplied side not having the will power to fight on to victory the more well supplied/equipped side will eventually win. Everything else (valor, strategy, tactics, etc) will generally just determine how long that victory takes.
However, I do think there's a confounding factor here: supply lines.
Not that this discounts the idea of which side is better supplied, but that the supply lines need to be factored in as something that the side with longer supply lines must be that much more well resourced in order to be considered "equal".
In no way was the British empire in the 1770's less well-resourced than the American colonies. But our resources were local to the field of battle whereas the Brits were not.
That said, I think fundamentally the American victory in the Revolutionary War eventually came down to fatigue on the other side of the pond. I'm sure, had the British truly devoted themselves to the war, that they could have won (even with the French help to the Americans). But the long supply lines made that war much more costly for them than it would have been otherwise, and thus contributed to the fatigue.
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From Parameters, Autumn 2007, pp. 4-14.
The late Colonel Harry Summers liked to tell a tale familiar to many who served in Vietnam. In April 1975, after the war was over, the colonel was in a delegation dispatched to Hanoi. In the airport, he got into a conversation with a North Vietnamese colonel named Tu who spoke some English and, as soldiers do, they began to talk shop. After a while, Colonel Summers said: “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu thought about that for a minute, then replied: “That may be so. But it is also irrelevant.”
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That said, I think fundamentally the American victory in the Revolutionary War eventually came down to fatigue on the other side of the pond. I'm sure, had the British truly devoted themselves to the war, that they could have won (even with the French help to the Americans). But the long supply lines made that war much more costly for them than it would have been otherwise, and thus contributed to the fatigue.
Agreed--and that's part of my point: things are not equal; the desire to fight (the motivation for the war) may be the most significant factor.
To peel a band-aid off a fresh sore, look at what's happening in Afghanistan now. The U.S. and our allies are way better supplied, better equipped, better trained, but...we have struggled to overcome the social structure in that country and how it facilitates the desire and capability of the Taliban to keep its power. So what to do? There is little chance that the U.S. can outlast the Taliban, and winning on the battlefield won't fix it. But, we're still not at the point of walking away from the Taliban's role in Al Qaeda's terrorism. And this kind of thing doesn't lend itself to pithy catchphrases.
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However, I do think there's a confounding factor here: supply lines.
Not that this discounts the idea of which side is better supplied, but that the supply lines need to be factored in as something that the side with longer supply lines must be that much more well resourced in order to be considered "equal".
In no way was the British empire in the 1770's less well-resourced than the American colonies. But our resources were local to the field of battle whereas the Brits were not.
That said, I think fundamentally the American victory in the Revolutionary War eventually came down to fatigue on the other side of the pond. I'm sure, had the British truly devoted themselves to the war, that they could have won (even with the French help to the Americans). But the long supply lines made that war much more costly for them than it would have been otherwise, and thus contributed to the fatigue.
This is a very good point that I think can be summarized simply by changing "better supplied and equipped" to "better supplied and equipped at the point of combat". Ie, At their peaks, both Napoleon and Hitler were far better supplied and equipped than the British. If either Napoleon or Hitler could have magically transported their armies across the Channel they would have made short work of the defending English armies but they couldn't swim across the Channel and that bought the British enough time to gather their strength and put together coalitions that eventually defeated both Corporal Napoleon and Corporal Hitler.
The same is true, for example, at Wake Island shortly after Pearl Harbor. The US, even then, was far better supplied and equipped than the Japanese but after the losses at Pearl Harbor it simply was not possible for the US to get the necessary men and equipment to Wake so the Japanese won. They were better supplied and equipped at that point at that time.
That is what makes the Guadalcanal campaign so fascinating to me. For nearly a year the US controlled the waters around Guadalcanal during the day (with aircraft from Henderson Field) while the Japanese controlled the waters around the island at night because they had a more powerful surface fleet. Thus the fight for a relatively small island took a really long time to resolve because neither side could gain a clear advantage in supply. Eventually the US did gain such an advantage and at that point the Japanese withdrew.
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“[At Guadalcanal, t]he U.S. Navy lost twenty-four major warships; the Japanese lost twenty-four. Aircraft losses too were nearly equal: America lost 436, Japan 440. Ashore, U.S. Marine and Army killed were 1,592 . . . . The number of Americans killed at sea topped five thousand. Japanese deaths set a bloody pace for the rest of the war, with 20,800 soldiers lost on the island and probably 4,000 sailors at sea.
“It was the most critical major military operation America would ever run on such a threadbare shoestring. . . . [T]he puzzle of victory was solved on the fly and on the cheap, in terms of resources if not lives. The campaign featured tight interdependence among warriors of the air, land, and sea. For the infantry to seize and hold the island, ships had to control the sea. For a fleet to control the sea, the pilots had to fly from the island’s airfield. For the pilots to fly from the airfield, the infantry had to hold the island. That tripod stood only by the strength of all three legs. . . . For most of the campaign, Guadalcanal was a contest of equals, perhaps the only major battle in the Pacific where the United States and Japan fought from positions of parity. Its outcome was often in doubt.”
~ James D. Hornfischer
Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
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If you are ever in Chicago I highly recommend the Museum of Science and Industry. They have a German WWII U-boat, the U505 in the museum. The story of the capture of the U505 and the fact that the US Navy's high command was actually VERY unhappy about it (because, unbeknownst to the commander on the scene, the US had already cracked the German code and the brass was afraid that the Germans would find out we captured on of their submarines and change their code) is fascinating.
Actually 3 polish mathematicians had broke the code in '39 then they were shuffled off to Bletchley Park where Alan Turing learned from them then advanced it as the war went on.I've heard 2 different versions - the Brits did snag a sub and boarded it before it could be scuttled but that never got out for security reasons.I had read also that they caught a fishing trawler that was in fact a NAZI spying vessel that had the enigma machine aboard
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To peel a band-aid off a fresh sore, look at what's happening in Afghanistan now. The U.S. and our allies are way better supplied, better equipped, better trained, but...we have struggled to overcome the social structure in that country and how it facilitates the desire and capability of the Taliban to keep its power. So what to do? There is little chance that the U.S. can outlast the Taliban, and winning on the battlefield won't fix it. But, we're still not at the point of walking away from the Taliban's role in Al Qaeda's terrorism. And this kind of thing doesn't lend itself to pithy catchphrases.
Well, you run into the problem of trying to win a war against a nation-state when it's really not even a nation-state.
The question is what is the goal of a war. To beat the other army and get them to stop waging war? Or to govern a country?
Well, if the other army isn't really an "army" but a loose organization of people that don't like us who have lots of weapons, you can't beat the other "army" because there's no cohesive organization that can surrender. So you really can't get them to stop waging war.
And the US isn't particularly good at governing other countries. [In recent times, it might be said we're not particularly good at governing our own!] Particularly when the people of said country don't really appreciate our attempts to govern, and then become a loose organization of people that don't like us and have lots of weapons.
It's just a hard situation without any clear line of victory but also without any coherent exit strategy.
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All true.
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“[At Guadalcanal, t]he U.S. Navy lost twenty-four major warships; the Japanese lost twenty-four. Aircraft losses too were nearly equal: America lost 436, Japan 440. Ashore, U.S. Marine and Army killed were 1,592 . . . . The number of Americans killed at sea topped five thousand. Japanese deaths set a bloody pace for the rest of the war, with 20,800 soldiers lost on the island and probably 4,000 sailors at sea.
“It was the most critical major military operation America would ever run on such a threadbare shoestring. . . . [T]he puzzle of victory was solved on the fly and on the cheap, in terms of resources if not lives. The campaign featured tight interdependence among warriors of the air, land, and sea. For the infantry to seize and hold the island, ships had to control the sea. For a fleet to control the sea, the pilots had to fly from the island’s airfield. For the pilots to fly from the airfield, the infantry had to hold the island. That tripod stood only by the strength of all three legs. . . . For most of the campaign, Guadalcanal was a contest of equals, perhaps the only major battle in the Pacific where the United States and Japan fought from positions of parity. Its outcome was often in doubt.”
~ James D. Hornfischer
Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal
I am fascinated by this campaign and by what I think were some significant missed opportunities by the Japanese. Twice the Japanese forced US Carrier units to abandon the area due to losses. First, in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in late August, 1945 the USS Enterprise was heavily damaged and had to return to Pearl Harbor for major repairs that took nearly two months to complete. Then at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in late October, 1942 the USS Hornet was sunk and Enterprise was damaged again.
I believe that if the Japanese had thrown everything they had at the Island after either of those engagements they likely could have pushed the US Marines off of Guadalcanal. This, I think, is particularly true of the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. About two weeks earlier a force of Japanese ships including BB's had devastated Henderson Field with a massive bombardment that destroyed more than half of the aircraft based there and nearly all available aviation fuel. Then the Hornet was lost and the Enterprise heavily damaged and the US Navy had no choice but to withdraw. In the event it that did not result in a major Japanese advantage because they also had taken damage and chose to withdraw their carrier units. My point is that they didn't have to. They still had two functioning CV's and they probably could have neutralized Henderson Field with a combination of carrier aircraft raids and another bombardment. Had they done so it would have left the US without air cover over the area and at that point the Japanese would have been able to deliver their supplies and equipment and take the island.
Of course that would not have prevented the US from eventually overwhelming the Japanese with massive amounts of ships and planes with which they simply couldn't compete. However, militaries are large bureaucracies that tend to overcompensate for past mistakes or perceived past mistakes. My thinking is that after a hypothetical US loss at Guadalcanal the perceived mistake would have been engaging the Japanese before overwhelming superiority could be achieved. IMHO, that likely would have paralyzed the US in the Pacific as a "Montgomery" mindset of "don't attack until you are so overwhelming that you can't possibly lose" would have set in. Thus, it probably would have pushed the rest of the US advances in the Pacific back by 18-24 months.
If the US advances in the Pacific had been so delayed by about 18-24 months then at the time of the German surrender (May 8, 1945) the Japanese would have been in roughly the situation they were actually in about 18-24 months earlier so mid-to-late 1943. Thus, when the Germans surrendered, the Japanese would still have had viable bargaining chips available. It is, of course, impossible to know whether they would have attempted to use them or whether the Allies would have been willing to have that discussion. The US also would likely have had to try to use A-bombs out of Chinese airfields because Guam, Saipan, and Tinian would not have been available.
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It would have been very tough getting the A-bombs, as well as all the supporting infrastructure, into China, Medina.
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Weren't they out of the ingrediants/components for awhile?But no one but the Brass knew
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that's what I remember
it would have taken a year or better to produce another bomb
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Can't prove it but Uncle Joe had to have the "BOMB" in the back of his mind.Lend-lease to the Leninites was substantial but the Western Allies had long distance Bombers and the REDS supply lines were certainly stretched.And when you think about they really didn't have a reliable Ally.So even though Uncle Joe didn't show it he knew a continued conflict wasn't a winning proposition
Shit some guy in FT Worth on Antiques Road Show just had a Rodin Sculpture estimated at 450,000 smackers
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There were three atomic bombs built in the spring of 1945 at Los Alamos.
Two used plutonium and one used uranium.
The plutonium type was considered more experimental, so one of them--"Gadget"--was tested at the Trinity site.
The uranium one--"Little Boy"--was dropped over Hiroshima.
The plutonium one--"Fat Man"--was dropped over Nagasaki.
That was all of them for the time being.
The B-29s had to be specially modified to "Silverplate" specifications. Special facilities were built on Tinian to house the bombs and transport them to the loading sites.
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https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-planned-to-drop-12-atomic-bombs-on-japan (https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-planned-to-drop-12-atomic-bombs-on-japan)
[color=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]Archival records show a third bomb was under assembly at Tinian in the Mariana Islands where the Enola Gay and Bockscar had flown from, with the main plutonium core about to be shipped from the U.S.[/color]
[color=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]Although some aircrew saw “Tokyo Joe” chalked on the bomb’s casing, it was said to be destined for Kokura, the original target for the second bomb, and named “Fat Boy.”[/color]
[color=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]A transcript of a top-level call between two military experts on August 13 reveals details of this “third shot.” It also confirmed that a vast production line of about 12 other atomic bombs was being readied for additional continuous strikes against other key targets.[/color]
[color=rgba(2, 20, 31, 0.85)]It was agreed this next bomb would be available to be dropped on August 19, with a schedule of further bombs available throughout September and October.[/color]
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Heh! Good info, CD.
I'm not sure if "Fat Boy" is right, though. It's my understanding that the term "Fat Man" was applied to all the Mark III plutonium bombs, including the two detonated in the Bikini Atoll tests of 1946.
Maybe "Fat Boy" is a typo in the Daily Beast article--a mashup of "Fat Man" and "Little Boy."
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Could be, I recall from the book "Enola Gay" (which is quite well done) that a third weapon was "on the way" and a dozen or so more were a few weeks off. By that point, Hanford was in full production of Pu and it was a matter of machining and assembly. A key was a device that could trigger conventional explosives very very close together, I forget the name of it now. You need that for the implosion device.
The uranium device had never been tested of course, they were confident it would work as it was simple.
These bombs weighed 10,000 pounds and only the B-29 in our inventory could carry one. I suppose the British Lancaster could carry the weight.
That remains an issue today with first generation atomic bombs, they tend to be heavy, perhaps 3,000 pounds, and you need a delivery system with that kind of capacity and range or it's almost useless.
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https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/little-boy-and-fat-man (https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/little-boy-and-fat-man)
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Fission/Fission9.shtml (http://www.atomicarchive.com/Fission/Fission9.shtml)
(https://i.imgur.com/MLhJfvg.png)
It's interesting, to me, with all the attention give to Iranian centrifuges and uranium enrichment, when the more efficient bombs are based on plutonium. Note that uranium 238 is the most common isotope in nature. Its very dense, and is used in sabot tank rounds to destroy other tanks. These bombs were detonated at about a mile above ground level to produce the most destruction.
Current US nuclear weapons are typically 8-10 x the explosive power of these weapons as they use a fusion device, which is triggered by a fission bomb, which is triggered using normal explosives. An Ohio class submarine carries 24 missiles, each of which can carry up to ten of these warheads. One sub could ruin an entire nation.
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It would have been very tough getting the A-bombs, as well as all the supporting infrastructure, into China, Medina.
It definitely would have been difficult and maybe impossible. I mentioned in one of these threads a while ago that I knew and took care of the yard of an old widow in my town whose husband had died "flying the hump" over the Himalayas from India into China.
I don't remember the exact number but I read about those early bombing missions from Chinese airfields against Japan and it took something like 6 flights back-and-forth from India to China to gather enough supplies for one attack mission from China to Japan. It was ridiculously inefficient.
AFAIK, they never actually landed a B29 with an A-bomb aboard until long after WWII ended. It might not have been possible and, if not, then there is almost no way that they could have launched an A-bomb raid from China because the bomb would have to have been flown in from India. Worse, those Chinese airfields and the territory between them and India were in contested areas. Can you imagine if they had flown an A-bomb into a Chinese airfield and then the airfield had been overrun by the Japanese?
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Weren't they out of the ingrediants/components for awhile?But no one but the Brass knew
that's what I remember
it would have taken a year or better to produce another bomb
CD already answered but this is incorrect. When I visited the Trinity site (open two days a year, really neat to see), they told us that in late '45 the US was geared up to produce roughly one bomb per month.
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could more information have come out after the early 80's when I took a history of WWII class at UNL?
probably just my poor memory
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Could be, I recall from the book "Enola Gay" (which is quite well done) that a third weapon was "on the way" and a dozen or so more were a few weeks off. By that point, Hanford was in full production of Pu and it was a matter of machining and assembly. A key was a device that could trigger conventional explosives very very close together, I forget the name of it now. You need that for the implosion device.
The uranium device had never been tested of course, they were confident it would work as it was simple.
These bombs weighed 10,000 pounds and only the B-29 in our inventory could carry one. I suppose the British Lancaster could carry the weight.
That remains an issue today with first generation atomic bombs, they tend to be heavy, perhaps 3,000 pounds, and you need a delivery system with that kind of capacity and range or it's almost useless.
There's a good book about the Los Alamos operation titled 109 East Palace. That was the address right off the Plaza in Santa Fe that was the "front office" for Los Alamos. 109 East Palace still exists. It's a little shop that sells the sort of touristy stuff that other little shops around the Plaza also sell.
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CD already answered but this is incorrect. When I visited the Trinity site (open two days a year, really neat to see), they told us that in late '45 the US was geared up to produce roughly one bomb per month.
It is true, though, that after dropping the Nagasaki bomb, we did not have another one ready to go. It would have been some weeks (a month or two?) before we could have dropped another one.
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could more information have come out after the early 80's when I took a history of WWII class at UNL?
probably just my poor memory
After all that shark water who would have guessed