. . . Could we have reached the Iranian government in 1952-53 and made peace between it and the UK regarding oil production, thus making Iran our friend in the middle east? Could that have been a better check on Soviet efforts in the middle east? Probably. Could we have understood the massive problems French colonialism caused in Vietnam, and supported a democratically elected government that represented the people of that country, instead of backing failed regimes? Maybe. . . .
Man, we made a hell of a lot of mistakes in Vietnam. A lot of them even before the French collapse.
But our mistakes came fast and furious once JFK decided he needed to restore American credibility after he got verbally beaten up by Khrushchev in Vienna in the summer of 1961. His need combined with McNamara's and the "Whiz Kids'" arrogance, combined with what was on the ground in Vietnam, were a fatal brew. He escalated our troop numbers from 900 to about 18,000 and colluded in the coup that overthrew Diem. And then LBJ doubled down and raised our troop levels to over half a million. Neither of them had a strategy to win. Both were trying to show American resolve without spreading the war further. It was crisis resolution that was the goal, not victory. And if the crisis could have been resolved without the loss of American credibility, even at the cost of the South Vietnamese government, that was acceptable.
William Westmoreland was a disaster as CG of MAC-V at the time the war was being lost. He shoved the ARVN aside and showed how we Americans do it in his quest for big, main-force battles. The ARVN, never great, lost credibility with its own people. And our firepower-heavy tactics ripped up the Vietnamese countryside and killed a lot of innocent civilians.
And yet, after all that, thanks to Operation Linebacker and Linebacker II, we got a marginally acceptable peace agreement in Jan 1973 that might have worked.
Except for Watergate and Nixon's exit from office. After that, Congress was in no mood to give a Republican president any more support for the Republic of Vietnam, and cut off all assistance. The ARVN, built largely in our image, needed lots of spare parts, ammunition, and POL, and suddenly it wasn't getting any more. It was defeated not by the "people's uprising" that the anti-war movement in America had predicted, but by a bigger, better Army with better training and better leadership. Just like France was beaten in 1940, only after 15 years of war rather than 6 weeks.
I think that Vietnam was a difficult situation at best. But if we had fought it smarter, it could have been a difficult, expensive win. We fought it poorly, and it was a difficult, expensive loss that killed a lot of Vietnamese and tore our country apart.